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Strike Settlement and Economie 
Activity 
An Empirical Analysis 
R. Swidinsky 
This paper explores the relationship between the 
outeome of strike and the level of économie activity. 
The findings are based on Canadian data for the period 
1901-1953. 
In this paper we explore the relation between the outeome of 
strikes and the level of économie activity. Several writers, but particu-
larly Griffen (1939) and Rees (1953), hâve argued that strike settlements 
hâve in gênerai favoured workers during upswings in the business 
cycle.1 Our findings based on Canadian data for the period 1901-1953 
tend, however, to contradict this view of union strike success. Similar-
ly, our findings offer little support to the arguments by Knowles (1952) 
and Hicks (1968) that a higher proportion of worker victories or 
compromises occurred when strikes were more numerous, large and 
short. Unfortunately, because of the discontinuity of our data in 1954 
we cannot be certain that our conclusions also hold for the i960's and 
1970's. 
STRIKE SUCCESS AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
The conventional explanations of the cyclical variance in industrial 
conflict are generally faced with problems of theoretical indeterminacy. 
Not only are they ambiguous as to 
when conflict occurs, they are 
equally incapable of predicting the 
outeome of the strike process. The 
1
 According to Griffen (1939, p. 90) there was a décline in the number of 
successful strikes in the trough years 1881, 1894, 1897, 1900, 1904, 1912, 1914, 1921 
and 1927. Rees (1953, pp. 378-379) observes additional déclines in 1930 and 1938, but 
he also observes an increase from 1930 to 1932. Unfortunately, neither Rees nor Griffen 
employ multivariate analysis to test for the cyclical sensitivity of strike success. 
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gênerai thrust of the theoretical arguments is that periods of prosperity 
présent labour with a tactical advantage in the bargaining process. 
The monetary loss facing striking workers is mitigated in periods of 
high employment by the increased capacity of unions to provide strike 
pay and by the growing availability of temporary employment oppor-
tunities. Also, in a tight labour market, the wage losses that arise from 
a strike are readily made up through the higher take-home pay result-
ing from increased wages and overtime pay once the strike is concluded. 
Hence, periods of prosperity are likely to resuit in inflated wage claims 
and a more fréquent resort to the strike threat by workers. 
The ambiguity of most bargaining models rests with the anticipated 
reaction of employers. Rees (1953) takes the position that, given the 
enhanced profits firms are likely to expérience in a rising market, 
management may well estimate the opportunity cost of a strike, which 
is measured as foregone profits minus the discounted value of any ex-
pected decrease in wage costs, to be excessive. The positive corrélation 
between the opportunity cost of disputes and économie activity is likely 
to cause management to yield more often to labour's demands in 
periods of prosperity. Hence, as Sapsford (1975) points out, despite a 
cyclical increase in the frequency of strike threats, strike frequency 
may actually decrease. 
Vanderkamp (1970) argues, however, that the opportunity cost of 
a dispute to the firm is lowest in an expansionary economy. He reasons 
that: (1) output réduction produces a greater relative réduction in profits 
at business cycle troughs because of the existence of fixed costs ; and 
(2) full capacity in the industry during peak business activity reduces 
the likelihood of a permanent loss of sales to other firms. If so, employer 
résistance to labour's demands is likely to be countercyclical, and the 
increased frequency of strike threats in an expanding economy is likely 
to produce an increased frequency of strikes as well. 
The analyses of cyclical strike frequency by Ashenfelter and 
Johnson (1969) for the U.S., Pencavel (1970) and Sapsford (1975) for 
the U.K. and Vanderkamp (1970) for Canada support the latter of thèse 
competing hypothèses. The mutual hardening of positions held by labour 
and management during a cyclical expansion increases the number of 
wage negotiations proceeding to the strike stage. What is less clear, 
however, is whether the mutual hardening of attitudes yields an 
advantage to either labour or management. 
A priori, there is no reason why either party to the dispute should 
gain the advantage. On the one hand, striking workers hâve additional 
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resources to withstand a strike of considerably longer duration, but as 
Levitt (1953) points out, they may also hâve additional financial obliga-
tions. During prolonged prosperity, workers tend to accumulate sizeable 
long-term financial commitments which would be jeopardized by a 
strike. But it is just thèse financial commitments that may compel 
workers to hold firm in their wage demands. In effect, the impact of 
an economic expansion on union behavior may be to shift Hicks' 
(1968, p. 143) union's résistance curve upwards and to make it more 
inelastic with respect to time. 
On the other hand, the wage an employer would be willing to 
pay if unconstrained by trade union pressure is also likely to increase 
in an expansionary economy. Moreover, if the firm's opportunity 
cost of a strike diminishes with economic activity, the employer's 
concession curve will similarly become more inelastic with respect to 
strike duration. Thus, whether the final wage settlement, which is 
determined by the intersection of the union's résistance and employer's 
concession curves, is closer to the union's wage demands in an ex-
pansionary or a recessionary economy remains ambiguous. The results 
will clearly dépend on the relative shifts of the concession and résistance 
curves and thèse shifts cannot be predicted by existing bargaining 
models. 
In the remainder of this paper we will attempt to détermine 
whether strike results are indeed sensitive to economic conditions. 
Presumably, the aggressive stance adopted by labour during periods of 
prosperity reflects to some extent rising expectations of success, but 
it would be interesting to détermine whether thèse expectations are, 
in fact, realized. The following section describes the historical set of 
data employed to test for the relation between strike results and eco-
nomic performance. Section III provides the empirical analysis of the 
aggregate data and Section IV provides some disaggregated results. 
In the final section, we attempt to reconcile the apparent inconsistency 
between strike frequency and strike success. 
STRIKE SUCCESS DATA 
From 1901 to 1953, the Canadian Department of Labour published 
annually information on the major issues, the duration, the magnitude 
and the results of strikes.2 This information was compiled from detailed 
2
 Canada Department of Labour, The Labour Gazette, Ottawa, monthly. 
Publication of data on strike results was discontinued in 1954. 
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reports submitted by the représentatives of employées and employers 
involved in a dispute. While this method of data gathering poses no 
major problems for the more factual information, it is less accurate in 
identifying the causes and results of strikes. Not only is there the 
possibility of inaccuracy at the reporting stage, there is also the 
possibility of error at the interpreting stage. Furthermore, the classifi-
cation of strike results poses several conceptual problems. (1) Should 
the appropriate criterion for judging strike success be based on the 
differential between the settlement and the union's final pre-strike 
demands, the employer's final pre-strike offers, or on the profitability 
of the strike as measured by wage gains and income losses ? (2) Should 
strike success be assessed only in terms of the workers' expressed 
demands? Workers may, for example, strike for increased wages in 
order to head off a wage réduction, or they may inflate their demands 
to improve their bargaining position. Finally, (3) should the possible 
long-run conséquences of a strike, such as more rapid mecnanization 
or the eventual migration of the struck firm, be included in judging 
the results of strikes ? 
The gênerai criterion for categorizing the outcome of strikes is 
based on the view that strikes in which workers gained the major part 
of their expressed pre-strike demands were deemed to hâve been 
resolved in favour of employées. Strikes in which workers failed to 
gain the major part of their demands were deemed to hâve been 
resolved in favour of employers, and strikes settled in some intermediate 
range were classified as compromises.3 A fourth category included 
strikes that were unsettled or not reported, or where the outcome was 
indefinite, but this category seldom included more than 10 percent of 
total strikes. 
Table 1 présents the results of ail strikes summarized by décade 
for the period 1901-1953. In this 53 year period, only 27 percent of 
ail strikes were resolved in favour of workers. There are, however, 
strong grounds for treating compromise settlements as outcomes 
favourable to workers. In many instances, a compromise represents 
material concessions by the employer in response to the pressures of 
a strike. If we accept the view that a compromise settlement is a 
3
 The exact criterion that was used to classify strike results is not known, 
but one can conceivably hâve chosen some variant of the following System for classifica-
tion. A settlement where a union won at least 66 percent of its demands is a substantial 
union victory ; where it won less than 33 percent, a substantial employer victory ; 
where it won between 33 and 66 percent, a compromise. Nonwage demands can be 
converted into monetary units and treated similarly. 
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TABLE I 
Percentage Distribution of the Outcome of Strikes: 1901-1953 
In Favour 1901- 1910- 1920- 1930- 1940- 1950- 1901-
of 1909 1919 1929 1939 1949 1953 1953 
Workers 28.7 30.8 23 A 31.7 25.6 19.6 27.0 
Compromise 24.4 29.1 23.9 32.8 31.3 37.1 29.7 
Workers and 
Compromise 53.1 59.9 47.0 64.5 56.9 56.7 56.7 
Employers 33.2 31.4 42.0 30.1 35.2 31.0 33.9 
Indefinite 13.7 8.7 11.0 5.4 7.9 12.2 9.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total Number 
of Strikes 1,102 1,506 1,176 1,410 2,306 816 8,316 
SOURCE: Canada Department of Labour, The Labour Gazette, Ottawa, monthly. 
partial victory for workers (or a partial defeat for management), more 
than half of ail strikes, 56.7 percent, were at least partially successful. 
By way of comparison, an estimated 60.4 percent of ail strikes in the 
U.S. from 1901 to 1937 were resolved at least partially in favour of 
workers.4 However, since the décision criterion was very likely 
différent in the two countries, this comparison may be somewhat 
misleading. 
The disaggregated data in Table II shows that workers were 
remarkably successful in strikes involving wage increases. Between 1912 
and 1953, workers were at least partially victorious in two-thirds 
of ail disputes over wage increases and over wage increases and other 
changes. Strikes against wage réductions proved somewhat less success-
ful, but this is understandable given the economic climate in which 
wage réductions generally were initiated. Workers were equally un-
successful in strikes involving union principles. Least successful, 
however, were strikes over hours and working conditions. Only 
44.5 percent of the 907 strikes over such issues were resolved either 
substantially or partially in favour of workers. 
It thus appears that strikes over wage increases are easier to 
win or that workers attach far greater significance to the resolution 
of strikes where wage increases are at issue. This is, perhaps, because 
4
 See Griffen (1939, p. 92). Griffen is of the opinion that the number of failures 
between 1880 and 1937 was depressingly high. 
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workers rank wages as the single most important factor in their employ-
ment contract, or because they consider nonwage factors as largely 
within the jurisdiction of management décision making. Equally plau-
sible is the argument that workers can readily calculate the net benefits 
of a strike over wage increases but not over nonwage issues. For 
management, however, the implications for profits of changes in hours 
and other conditions of work are as readily apparent as the implications 
of changes in wages. 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF STRIKE SUCCESS 
The relation between strike seulement and économie activity is 
explored through the following basic linear régression model : 
Rt = a + b Yt + c APt + d S t + e Dt + f Mt + g WD + h T 
where R = a measure of union strike success specified alternatively 
as 
1) the number of strikes settled in favour of workers (V) ; 
2) the number of strikes settled in favour of workers or in 
a compromise (VC) ; 
3) the proportion of strikes settled in favour of 
workers (V/S) ; 
4) the proportion of strikes settled in favour of workers 
or in a compromise (VC/S). 
Y = an économie activity variable defined as constant dollar 
GNP per capita as a percent of trend. 
A P = the percentage change in the consumer price index 
defined as 100 (P-P.,)/P ,. 
S = the total number of strikes for which a definite outeome 
was recorded. 
D = the average duration of strikes defined as the ratio of 
timeloss in mandays to the number of workers involved 
in strikes. 
M = the average size of strikes defined as the average number 
of workers involved per strike. 
WD = a wartime dummy variable set equal to unity for the 
years 1914-1918 and 1940-1945 and zéro otherwise. 
T = a linear trend variable set at unity in 1901. 
t = a time period subscript. 
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TABLE 2 
Percentage Distribution of the Outcome of Strikes 
by Cause: 1912-1953 
Major Cause Total 
Number PERCENT IN FA VOUR OF 
of strikes Workers Compromise Employers Indemnité 
For Wage Increases 1,784 31.2 32.3 30.3 6.2 
For Wage Increase 
and Other Changes 1,674 29.3 40.1 15.1 15.5 
Against Wage 
Réductions 406 23.4 27.3 41.1 8.2 
Hours and Working 
Conditions 907 23.9 20.6 48.5 7.0 
Unionism and Other 
Issues 2,229 31.4 20.3 39.0 9.3 
SOURCE: Canada Department of Labour, The Labour Gazette, Ottawa, monthly. 
The economic activity, price change, wartime dummy and time trend 
variables hâve been commonly included as explanators of strike 
activity and their présence in our strike success model is based on 
similar considérations. The unemployment rate is perhaps the more 
adéquate indicator of cyclical economic conditions, but because a 
reliable historical séries on unemployment is not available for Canada, 
the déviation from trend of GNP per capita employed previously by 
Vanderkamp (1970) is used as a proxy measure. The A P variable is 
generally assumed to take into account the spécial forces of price 
inflation on strike activity and, presumably, strike success. Not only 
will workers strike more frequently but they will also be more deter-
mined to win when inflation erodes their real incomes. Positive Y and 
A P coefficients in ail spécifications of the model would, of course, 
reveal that striking workers hâve a higher success rate during periods 
of economic expansion and price inflation. 
The wartime dummy is included in the model in order to capture 
the spécial circumstances that prevailed during 1914-1918 and 1940-
1945. Given the emphasis on production, employers were pressured 
not only to minimize the incidence of strikes but also to settle whatever 
strikes resulted without delay. One would thus expect a sharp rise in 
relative strike success during the war periods. The sign of the trend 
coefficient cannot be predicted with certainty, but given the sharp 
increase in strikes in the last three décades, it is very likely to be posi-
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tive. One would not expect a three-fold increase in strike frequency 
in the face of a secular décline in the rate of worker success. 
The remaining explanatory variables are designed to capture the 
impact of the «shape» of industrial conflict on its effectiveness.5 Hicks 
(1968, p. 145) has argued that lengthy strikes generally resuit in em-
ployer victories, and Knowles (1952, pp. 240-259) has similarly con-
concluded from the British strike expérience that unions were victorious 
more frequently when strikes were numerous, involved many workers 
and were of short duration. Our model attempts to capture the shape 
of industrial conflict by the S, M and D variables, but it should be 
recognized that thèse éléments of industrial conflict may be sensitive 
to économie conditions. The S coefficient is expected to be positive in 
ail model spécifications, although the positive relation between strike 
frequency and absolute strike success can rest on more obvious 
grounds. The M coefficient is expected to be positive and the D coeffi-
cient négative. 
The estimâtes presented in Table III are based on aggregate 
annual data for the period 1901-1953.6 The overall explanatory powers 
of the four models are mixed, with the proportionate models being 
relatively weak in explaining the variance in strike success. This is not 
unexpected. Whereas most of the explanatory powers of équations (1) 
and (2) are contained in the strikes variable, the explanatory powers 
of équations (3) and (4) rest primarily with the remaining variables, 
and thèse variables alone cannot fully explain the variance in relative 
strike success. 
AU four équations show that union strike success tended to décline 
as économie activity accelerated. The estimated coefficients in équations 
(2) and (4), for example, suggest that if real per capita GNP rose by 
5 percent above trend workers would lose two additional strikes, or 
an additional 1.3 percent of ail strikes in which they were engaged. 
By contrast, price inflation appears to hâve given unions strong leverage 
in overcoming management résistance to their demands. This resuit 
suggests that during inflationary periods, unions are less hésitant in 
making demands which lead to strike situations because they realize 
that the probability of winning such strikes is considerably higher. 
5
 There has been a growing interest among industrial relations analysts, 
particularly sociologists, in the various dimensions, or shape, of industrial conflict. See 
Britt and Galle (1974). 
6
 Data on strike success and strike shape are gathered from Canada Depart-
ment of Labour, Labour Gazette, Ottawa, monthly. Data on Y and AP are taken from 
Vanderkamp (1970, Appendix). 
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Our results do not support the hypothesis that the environment 
prevailing during the war years made it easier for workers to win strikes. 
The explanation may lie in the fact that in a war environment strikers 
generally lack the support of public opinion. The trend coefficients 
show that the number and proportion of strikes substantially won by 
workers had declined with time, but that the number and proportion 
of strikes at least partially won by workers had increased. This implies 
an increased effectiveness of the strike, a trend that has been inferred 
by Lipsky and Farber (1976, p. 392) from the observed changes in 
strike frequency, size and duration. Assuming that the estimated trend 
coefficient is stable, our calculations suggest that workers would hâve 
at least partially won 16 percent more strikes in 1974 than in 1901. One 
would suspect, however, given the technological changes and the spread 
of unionism, especially into the public sector since 1950, that the trend 
towards compromise settlements has been accelerating in the last two 
décades. If this is indeed so, it would provide at least a partial expia-
nation for the sharp upward trend in strikes in Canada since the early 
1960's. 
The inference that strike effectiveness has been increasing over 
time rests on the hypothesized impact of the shape of industrial conflict 
on the ability of workers to win strikes. However, our results fail to 
support any of the hypothesized relationships between the strike shape 
variables and strike effectiveness. Strike frequency, as expected, exerts 
a positive effect on absolute strike success, but it has no significant 
effect on relative strike success. Neither the size nor duration of 
strike variables cornes through significantly in any of the équations. 
Furthermore, the signs of the D and M coefficients are not consistent 
with expectations in several équations. 
SOME DISAGGREGATED RESULTS 
In this section we dérive estimâtes of the union success équation 
for strikes disaggregated into wage and nonwage issues.7 The régression 
resuit that aggregate union strike success is correlated negatively with 
economic performance may be attributed to some statistical peculiarity, 
such as the mix of strike issues. For example, if there is a cyclical 
7
 Ail strikes in which wage increase was at least one of the issues involved 
are included in the wage category. Strikes over hours, working conditions, unionism 
and other issues are included in the non-wage category. Strikes over wage réductions 
are omitted. 
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TABLE 3 
Régression Equations for Strike Success 
Equation (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dépendent 
Variable V VC VIS vas 
Constant 48.71* 33.19* 66.46* 80.84* 
(2.53) (2.57) (5.98) (8.88) 
Yt -0 .42* -0 .38* -0 .29* -0 .23* 
(2.14) (2.93) (2.54) (2.57) 
APt 0.89* 1.21* 0.72* 0.90* 
(1.99) (4.04) (2.79) (4.26) 
St 0.35* 0.59* 0.01 -0 .01 
(8.35) (21.12) (0.23) (0.34) 
Dt -0 .22 0.06 -0 .19 0.02 
(0.98) (0.37) (1.47) (0.23) 
Mt 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0 .01 
(1.40) (0.18) (1.03) (0.89) 
WD -0 .48 -3 .19 1.18 0.03 
(0.08) (0.79) (0.34) (0.09) 
T 0.70* 0.22 -0 .35* 0.22* 
(3.33) (1.55) (2.91) (2.26) 
R- 75.9 95.8 33.8 41.0 
Durbin-Watson 1.56+ 1.50 + 1.22 1.57 + 
* Significant by the criterion of a t-value (entered in parenthesis) greater than 1.96. 
+ Durbin-Watson test for sériai corrélation is inconclusive at the 5 percent level of 
significance. Test reveals positive sériai corrélation in équation (3). 
increase in those catégories of strikes that hâve a lower rate of success, 
the proportion of total strikes won may well demonstrate a eounter-
cyclical pattern even if each category has a cyclical response. 
The proportions of strikes over wage and nonwage issues 
(VCW/SW and VCN/SN, respectively) that were at least partly success-
ful were regressed on the dépendent variables included in the aggregate 
équations for the period 1913-1953.8 The results, reported as équations 
(5) and (6), do not alter the basic conclusions derived from the aggregate 
équations, but there are several significant différences. 
(5) VCW/SW t = 75.91 - 0.17 Y t + 1.16 AP t - 0.05 SWt + 0.19 D t 
(7.65) (1.57) (4.08) (1.23) (1.42) 
+ 0.01 Mt - 1.47 WD 4- 0.30 T R2 = 43.4 
(0.46) (0.45) (2.40) DW = 1.62 
Disaggregated data is available only from 1913 to 1953. 
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(6) VCN/SN t = 94.25 - 0.41 Y t + 0.17 AP t + 0.01 SN t - 0.08 D t 
(6.55) (2.50) (0.52) (1.05) (0.38) 
- 0.02 M t + 3.52 W D - 0.003 T R2 = 27.1 
(0.89) (0.72) (0.02) DW = 1.51 
First, the disaggregated results are expectedly weaker. The 
economic activity indicator remains négative but it is no longer signif-
icant in strikes over wage increases. It would thus appear that the 
aggregate results must be due to the proportionately greater loss of 
strikes over hours, working conditions and union issues in the upswing 
of the business cycle. Presumably, unions are more sélective in the 
timing of strikes for higher wages, or more determined to win thèse 
strikes. 
Price inflation, by contrast, had a sizeable positive impact on the 
success of wage related strikes but not on the success of nonwage 
strikes. This finding is predictable. Price inflation, with its incumbent 
érosion of real wages, strengthens workers' arguments for wage in-
creases and weakens managements arguments against such adjust-
ments, especially if profit levels are also inflated. The rival positions 
on working conditions and union issues would appear to dépend far 
less on the pace of price changes. 
The variables that delineate the shape of industrial conflict as 
well as the wartime dummy remain insignificant in the disaggregated 
équations. However, the upward trend in union strike success still 
shows up, but only in strikes involving wage increase. Unions appear 
not to hâve increased their share of nonwage strikes won over time. 
STRIKE FREQUENCY AND STRIKE SUCCESS 
Given the counter-cyclical behavior of worker strike success, how 
can one explain the observed cyclical swings in strike frequency? 
Presumably, unions would wish to avoid strikes during periods when 
the probability of success was relatively low, but this appears not to 
hâve been the case. There are several plausible explanations for this 
apparent inconsistency. 
One possibility is that expressed wage demands do not accurately 
reflect the target wages striking workers hâve in mind. There may be a 
tendency for workers to inflate their wage claims on the assumption 
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that the resulting compromise settlement will be near the target wage.9 
Thus, a settlement that appears to be a defeat for workers may, in fact, 
be a sizeable victory. But this argument is not entirely persuasive. For 
one, if such a strategy is successful, why would it not be employed 
during recessionary periods as well? 
An alternative argument along similar lines is that in a cyclical 
expansion union expectations increase more rapidly than management's, 
partly because workers operate on a shorter time horizon. The process 
of compromise implies that although wage settlements are increasing 
they are doing so at a slower rate than wage demands. Thus the widen-
ing gap between expressed demands and wage settlements gives the 
impression of a union defeat in spite of the fact that there is also a 
widening gap between the settlement and management's final pre-
strike offer. The appropriate measure of success is perhaps the latter 
gap, but our data, unfortunately, does not yield this kind of information. 
A somewhat différent but equally plausible explanation of the con-
flicting cyclical behavior of strike frequency and worker strike success 
is contained in the assumption that employers initiate strikes. According 
to Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969, p. 37) an employer has the options 
of giving in to the union's final demand or taking a strike. Clearly, a 
profit maximizing employer will opt for the alternative that yields 
higher profits, and his calculations of profits will involve the initial 
benefits sought by the union and the decay rate of the union's demands 
during the course of the strike. 
In a rising market, the union's initial demands and the decay rate 
of thèse demands makes the taking of a strike the more profitable 
alternative. But as Vanderkamp (1970, p. 220) points out, this approach 
fails to corne to grips with the familiar problem that if the information 
necessary for making thèse profit calculations is available to either or 
both sides in the dispute, the need for a strike disappears. Clearly, 
if unions gained access to such information, their wage demands would 
stop just short of the point where strike-taking became the more 
profitable alternative. 
Perhaps the most fruitful approach in reconciling the observed 
behavior of strike frequency and strike success is to assume that 
workers bargain primarily over wage and benefit structures. In a rising 
market, some workers, given the nature of their product and labour 
9
 Comay, Melnik and Subotnik (1974) provide some interesting insights into 
the process of reaching a compromise settlement. 
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markets, can increase their bargaining power in relation to other groups 
of employées. The more powerful unions proceed to extract conces-
sions from their employers to the limit of their bargaining power, and, 
in so doing, disrupt the previously accepted structure of wages. Other 
unions will attempt to préserve the wage structure by making com-
pensating demands but, given the relative weakness of their bargaining 
power, they will be forced into a strike situation. Many employers 
would find it more profitable to accept a strike rather than to yield to 
the demands of relatively weaker unions. Furthermore, the bargaining 
position of thèse unions implies that a smaller proportion of strikes 
will be settled in favour of workers. Also, unorganized workers, con-
cerned with their deteriorating position, will attempt, perhaps pre-
maturely, to form unions and to make wage and other demands on 
their employers.10 Thèse initial efforts are likely to encounter strong 
employer reaction and the ensuing strikes are likely to resuit in a con-
siderably lower rate of worker success. 
To make the model consistent, one has to assume that in a de-
pressed market, bargaining power becomes less dispersed so that even 
the more powerful unions cannot disrupt seriously the structure of 
wages and other benefits. This approach is probably the direction in 
which bargaining theory out to proceed, but the development of the 
appropriate model is beyond the intended scope of this paper. 
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Le règlement des grèves et l'activité économique 
Cet article traite de l'efficacité des conflits de travail en regard des cycles éco-
nomiques. Même si les formes de négociations ne permettent pas de prédire l'issue 
dans l'évolution d'une grève, plusieurs analystes en matière de relations professionnelles 
ont estimé que les règlements de grèves étaient davantage aux travailleurs en période 
d'expansion économique. D'autres analystes ont souligné que, proportionnellement, un 
plus grand nombre de grèves se réglaient favorablement aux travailleurs, lorsque celles-
ci étaient nombreuses, touchaient un plus grand nombre de salariés et qu'elles étaient 
de courte durée. Toutefois, il n'y a guère eu d'études approfondies visant à connaître 
les causes d'efficacité d'une grève en se basant sur l'analyse des cycles économiques. 
L'étude précédente est fondée sur une seule série de données, soit celles que 
publie chaque année le ministère canadien du Travail. Ces données, qui sont analysées 
ici pour la période de 1901 à 1953, fournissent des renseignements sur les causes et 
les résultats des grèves au Canada. Même s'il s'agit de critères plus ou moins bien 
tranchés, on a de fait rangé les grèves en trois catégories quant à leurs résultats: règle-
ments surtout favorables aux travailleurs, règlements surtout favorables aux employeurs 
et règlements de compromis. De 1901 à 1953, on a estimé que 56.7 pour cent des grèves 
se sont terminées par un règlement favorable aux salariés ou par un compromis. On y 
voit aussi que les travailleurs ont davantage réussi à obtenir des gains quand l'enjeu 
portait sur les salaires. 
Le degré de succès des grèves a été vérifié en regard de l'activité économique 
au moyen d'une analyse de régression linéaire en choississant comme variables expli-
catives un indicateur de l'activité économique, le mouvement des prix, la fréquence, la 
durée et l'ampleur des grèves, une approximation factice (dumny) pour les deux pério-
des de guerre ainsi qu'une mesure linéaire. La variable dépendante consistait dans le 
nombre absolu des grèves et le pourcentage de celles où les salariés avaient obtenu 
des gains substantiels ou mitigés. 
Le résultat de cette analyse indique que, de 1901 à 1953, les travailleurs ont 
gagné moins de grèves, aussi bien en chiffres absolus qu'en pourcentage, pendant les 
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périodes d'expansion économique. L'inflation leur a cependant permis d'accroître le 
nombre de leurs gains. Dans l'ensemble, on observe qu'assez peu de grèves se sont 
réglées substantiellement à l'avantage des salariés, mais que, dans beaucoup d'autres, 
ils ont obtenu des gains partiels. Rien ne montre que le type de grève non plus que les 
deux guerres n'aient eu de répercussions sur le degré d'efficacité des grèves. 
Dans la dernière partie de son étude, l'auteur analyse quelques-unes des raisons 
pour lesquelles les travailleurs déclarent souvent la grève lorsque leurs chances de 
succès sont limitées. L'explication la plus plausible en est que l'on admet l'existence 
de différences de pouvoir de marchandage parmi les syndicats et aussi le fait que les 
salariés négocient davantage en faveur des structures de salaire plutôt qu'en faveur des 
niveaux de salaires. 
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